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The New “Human Equity” Transactions 
Shu-Yi Oei* & Diane M. Ring** 
INTRODUCTION 
The diverse U.S. financial landscape offers opportunities to invest in land, 
businesses, corporations, and intellectual property. But can we invest in other 
humans? Should we be permitted to own a stake in someone else’s human 
capital just as we own other assets? Over the past two years, new financing 
structures have emerged that enable investors to provide funding to individuals 
in exchange for a percentage of that individual’s future earnings over a 
specified time period. Some of these new structures connect investors to 
individuals seeking financing for education or business costs. Another targets 
high-profile athletes and allows investors to acquire a stake in the athlete’s 
future earnings in exchange for a current investment, which is paid to the 
athlete. 
Although the details vary, each of these financing vehicles essentially 
permits funding providers to take a slice of the recipient’s future return on her 
human capital over a certain time period, securing the upside if earnings are 
high and bearing the downside risk if earnings are lower than anticipated. Put 
differently, they allow individuals to monetize indeterminate future earning 
streams in exchange for immediate funding. This represents a significant 
departure from traditional forms of debt financing. While these arrangements 
do have precursors in older arrangements or proposals, such as Bowie Bonds1 
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1.  See, e.g., Bowie’s Latest Hit: Royalty-Tied Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1997, at B5 
(describing asset-backed securities that allow investors to receive a cut of future revenue derived from 
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or human capital contracts,2 the current social and financial environment, 
paired with the availability of technology that enables access to a large number 
of investors, magnifies their potential impact. 
The fact that these new arrangements differ from traditional debt raises an 
important question: What kind of financing arrangement are they, and how 
should they be classified for a variety of legal and regulatory purposes? Both 
the popular press and the businesses promoting these new investment structures 
have loosely characterized them as a type of ownership interest in humans.3 For 
example, one company describes its structure as an opportunity to “invest 
directly in the person, not their idea or business”4 and encourages potential 
financers to “[i]nvest in people – literally.”5 Another urges: “Invest in Talent. 
[Our company] turns talent into an asset.”6 Still another has been described in 
the media as providing a chance to “own a piece of an athlete.”7 These 
descriptions, if accurate, raise clear ethical (not to mention constitutional) 
 
David Bowie’s albums). 
2.  For an early discussion of human capital contracts, see Milton Friedman & Simon Kuznets, 
INCOME FROM INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 90 n.20 (National Bureau of Economic 
Research 1954) (“[I]f individuals sold ‘stock’ in themselves, i.e., obligated themselves to pay a fixed 
proportion of future earnings, investors could ‘diversify’ their holdings and balance capital 
appreciations against capital losses.”). See also Miguel Palacios Lleras, INVESTING IN HUMAN 
CAPITAL (2004) (suggesting an equity-like human capital contracts approach to education financing). 
3.  See, e.g., Mark O’Neill, Upstart: Backers Invest in You, and Your Future Earnings Repay 
Them, SMALL BUS. TRENDS (Feb. 20, 2014), http://smallbiztrends.com/2014/02/upstart-backers-
invest-future-student-earnings.html (noting that “[s]ome have criticized Upstart as indentured servitude 
or slavery” but disagreeing with that characterization); Matt Levine, Football Player Derivatives are 
the Best Derivatives, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/ 
2013-11-01/football-player-derivatives-are-the-best-derivatives (“The squick factor is obvious -- you're 
buying a person! indentured [sic] servitude! etc.”); Elliot Hannon, Is This Indentured Servitude or the 
New Venture Capital?, SLATE (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/ 
2013/10/29/companies_look_to_loan_you_money_in_return_for_a_percentage_of_your_future.html 
(noting that Upstart “feels a lot like indentured servitude”); James Surowiecki, The New Futurism, THE 
NEW YORKER, (November 4, 2013),  http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20131031185150/http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2013/11/04/131104ta_talk_surowiecki 
(noting that the Upstart “concept seems uncomfortably close to indentured servitude”); Kevin 
Robertson, Owning a Player: Fantex and the Arian Foster IPO, THE SPORTS LAW CANARY (Nov. 23, 
2013), http://sportslawnews.wordpress.com/2013/11/23/owning-a-player-fantex-and-the-arian-foster-
ipo/ (“There is something morally wrong for a society that has moved past slavery to then allow a 
person to become indebted to another for life.”). 
4.  See UPSTART (Apr. 19, 2014), https://www.upstart.com/; see also Archived Upstart 
Webpage, INTERNET ARCHIVE WAY BACK MACH. (Apr. 19, 2014), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20140419222848/https://www.upstart.com/. Another Upstart ad 
characterizes the financing structure as one in which “people invest in people.”  See Upstart Ad on 
Boston.Com, BOSTON.COM (Apr. 22, 2014) (copy on file with the authors). 
5.  See Archived Upstart Webpage, supra note 4.  
6.  See PAVE, http://www.pave.com (last visited Apr. 30, 2014). 
7.  Darren Rovell, Fantex to Offer Arian Foster Stock, ESPN NFL (Oct. 18, 2013),  
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/9838351/fantex-brokerage-services-offer-stock-arian-foster-houston-
texans; see also Mark DeBambre, Own a Piece of an NFL Star, N.Y. POST, BUSINESS (Oct. 17, 2013), 
http://nypost.com/2013/10/17/want-to-own-a-piece-of-an-nfl-star-you-may-soon-be-able-to/; Joy 
Chakravarty, Want to ‘Own’ an NFL Star? Now You Can with Fantex Holdings, SPORT 360° (Oct. 27, 
2013), http://v1.sport360.com/other-sports/want-own-nfl-star-now-you-can-fantex-holdings. 
268 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  -05:266 
questions.8 The mere possibility that these transactions might be considered 
ownership suggests that they should be carefully monitored and potentially 
circumscribed and regulated. The need for vigilance is particularly acute 
because these transactions will undoubtedly evolve. Even if current iterations 
are not problematic, more aggressive future variations may be. Assuming that 
some of these arrangements are normatively permissible, present law lacks a 
framework for their regulation. In sum, these transactions pose serious 
questions for our legal system. 
The initial task, then, is to determine the essential character of these 
transactions. Do they constitute unacceptable ownership of a human (or 
something closely analogous), as suggested by the popular press? This Essay 
argues that, to answer this question, we should draw upon existing 
jurisprudence that has developed to distinguish between debt and equity in the 
business context. Such debt-equity analysis is commonly employed in the tax 
and bankruptcy fields to distinguish creditors from firm owners in order to 
determine their proper legal and regulatory treatment. This Essay constitutes 
the first serious attempt in the legal literature at proposing a framework for 
analyzing whether these new transactions are normatively acceptable and, if so, 
what regulatory issues they may raise.9 
Part I describes two examples of these new transactions—Upstart and 
Fantex. Upstart’s income share agreements enable investors to fund an 
individual’s start-up, project, or retirement of student loans. In return, investors 
receive a percentage of the individual’s income for a number of years. Fantex 
offers investors the opportunity to invest in stock that pays the investor a 
percentage of a professional athlete’s future sports-related income. Fantex pays 
the athlete an upfront payment (funded by the amounts invested) in exchange 
for which the athlete agrees to pay Fantex a percentage of his future income.  
Part II argues that while these arrangements do not create direct 
ownership in humans as property, there is a risk that they may contractually 
approximate property ownership in problematic and undesirable ways. The 
challenge is determining whether a given transaction creates such human 
ownership via financial contract. Part II suggests that borrowing from tax law’s 
debt-equity analysis can help determine when a transaction creates human 
ownership and can also help evaluate the normative desirability of these deals. 
Part III offers a case study of one particular transaction to demonstrate how 
debt-equity analysis could be adapted to the new human financing 
transactions.10 As the case study reveals, use of a modified debt-equity 
 
8.    See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (prohibiting slavery); see also Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. 
Ring, Human Equity and Contemporary Ownership: Conceptualizing and Taxing the New Human 
Equity Transactions (forthcoming). For a discussion focusing on securities regulations issues regarding 
these transactions, see Jeff Schwartz, The Corporatization of Personhood, ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2015) (on file with authors). 
9.    We develop our analysis further in forthcoming work. See Oei & Ring, supra note 8.  
10.  In this Essay, we use the term “human financing transactions” to refer to Upstart, Fantex, 
Pave, and other similar emerging transactions. 
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framework can assist in determining whether a given transaction exhibits the 




In April 2012, Upstart introduced a funding model that allows potential 
investors to finance individuals seeking funding for business or education costs 
in exchange for a percentage of that individual’s future earnings over a set time 
period.11 Among the funding recipients profiled on the Upstart website were the 
owner of a technology start-up looking to expand his business,12 a recent 
business school graduate looking for financing to start an e-commerce 
business,13 and a 2012 law school graduate looking to retire his student debt.14 
In return for an upfront cash investment in the individual seeking funding 
(Recipient), the investors (Backers) earn a specified percentage of the 
Recipient’s earnings for a set term, typically five years.15 The underlying 
documentation is a funding agreement between Upstart (as middleman) and the 
Recipient.16 In exchange for the funds, the Recipient agrees to pay the Backer 
 
11. See PAVE, supra note 6; Alison Griswold, Upstart: Can Crowdfunding Your Education 
and Career Really Work? FORBES (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/alisongriswold/2012/08/10/upstart-can-crowdfunding-your-education-and-career-really-work/2/; 
PAVE, supra note 6. 
12. Paul Foley, UPSTART (January 24, 2014), https://www.upstart.com/upstarts/paul-foley, 
available at https://web.archive.org/web/20140124072310/https://www.upstart.com/upstarts/paul-
foley. Profiles of the Upstart funding seekers are now available only upon signing in to the Upstart 
website. 
13. Rachel Honeth Kim, UPSTART (March 31, 2014), https:// 
www.upstart.com/upstarts/rachel-honeth-kim, available at https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20140331074530/https://www.upstart.com/upstarts/rachel-honeth-kim. 
14. Jeremy Glapion, UPSTART (March 31, 2014), https://www.upstart.com/upstarts/jeremy-
glapion, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20140331074133/https://www.upstart.com/upstarts/ 
jeremy-glapion. 
15. See Upstart Funding Agreement, at cl. 5.a, https://www.upstart.com/funding_terms (last 
visited April 28, 2014) (on file with the authors) [hereinafter 2014 UPSTART AGREEMENT]. Previously, 
an option for a ten-year term was offered. See, e.g., October 2013 Upstart Funding Agreement, 
Upstart, at cl. 5.a, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20121022201202/http://www.upstart.com/ 
how-it-works/upstarts (last visited Oct. 7, 2013) (on file with the authors) [hereinafter 2013 UPSTART 
AGREEMENT] (explicitly stating that the term of the agreement could be either five or ten years).  
16. Upstart interposes a grantor trust (with Upstart as the trustor and a Delaware bank as 
trustee) between the Backers and the Recipient. See Who is Upstart Network Trust?, UPSTART, 
http://investorhelp.upstart.com/questions/83773-Who-is-Upstart-Network-Trust (last visited May 11, 
2014). Upstart enters into the funding agreement with the Recipient and then transfers the funding 
agreement to the Trust (where it becomes a Trust asset). See id. The Trust issues securities to the 
Backers in exchange for funds that are used to pay the Recipient. See Who is the Issuer of the 
Securities?, UPSTART, http://investorhelp.upstart.com/questions/83774-Who-is-the-issuer-of-the-
securities (last visited May 11, 2014). The Trust securities are secured by the funding agreements and 
the Backers only receive payment to the extent the Recipient pays the Trust. See When Will the Trust 
Make Payments on a Loan Related Security, UPSTART, http://investorhelp.upstart.com/questions/ 
83798-When-will-the-trust-make-payments-on-a-Loan-Related-Security (last visited May 11, 2014); 
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(indirectly) the agreed percentage (the “income share”) of the Recipient’s total 
annual income as reported on her tax return17 over the specified term.18 Thus, 
the return to the Backers depends on the financial success of the Recipient. 
The risk to the Backers is partially mitigated by the funding agreement’s 
deferral provision, which defers the annual income payments if the Recipient’s 
income for the year falls below a preestablished threshold. If this deferral 
provision is triggered, another year is added to the contract term. Recipients can 
obtain up to five such deferrals. After the fifth deferral, the Recipient is 
obligated to pay the income share for the remainder of the now-extended 
contract term.19 The “risk” of the Recipient’s extraordinary success is also 
moderated by capping the total income payment at three times the amount of 
funding received.20 
On May 6, 2014, Upstart announced that it would “sunset” these income-
share agreements and focus exclusively on traditional lending.21 Interestingly, 
the announcement noted that “while many regulatory and policy efforts are 
underway to facilitate the development of the market, these efforts will likely 
take many years.”22 This Essay is a response to both the growth of this family 
of financing structures as well as to the conceptual and regulatory uncertainty 
that surrounds them. Our analysis is based on the Upstart income-share 
agreements offered through May 2014 (and which remain outstanding), as well 
as similar structures that continue to be offered.23 
 
Will the Issuer Make Payments on a Loan-Related Security if There is a Payment Default Under the 
Corresponding Loan for the Related Security?, UPSTART, http://investorhelp.upstart.com/questions/ 
83800-Will-the-Issuer-make-payments-on-a-Loan-Related-Security-if-there-is-a-payment-default-
under-the-corresponding-loan-for-the-Loan-Related-Security (last visited May 11, 2014). 
17.  The annual income amount that the Recipient agrees to share is her total income listed on 
IRS Form 1040, Line 22. See 2014 UPSTART AGREEMENT, supra note 15, at cl. 2.a.i. Significantly, not 
only does Line 22 include the Recipient’s wage income and business income, it also includes interest, 
dividends, alimony, and lottery winnings (i.e., income regardless of any connection to the Upstart 
proposal that attracted the Backers’ attention). 
18.  The 2013 Agreement also required that the Recipient not only pay the agreed percentage 
of the Recipient’s total annual income, but also a percentage of any equity-based deferred 
compensation received from her employer.  See 2013 UPSTART AGREEMENT, supra note 15, at cl. 2.a.  
19.  2014 UPSTART AGREEMENT, supra note 15, at cl. 2.b.i. The 2013 Agreement also 
included a hardship exemption for years in which the Recipient’s income dropped below twenty-
thousand dollars even if the contract had previously been deferred five times for low earnings. No 
additional contract extension would be made in such circumstances. 2013 UPSTART AGREEMENT, 
supra note 15, at cl. 2.b.ii. 
20.  2014 UPSTART AGREEMENT, supra note 15, at cl. 2.c. In the 2013 Agreement, which 
explicitly noted the option of a ten-year contract, the cap was five times the funding amount in the case 
of a ten-year agreement. 2013 UPSTART AGREEMENT, supra note 15, at cl. 2.c. 
21.  David Girouard, Sunsetting Income Share Agreements on Upstart, Upstart Blog, Upstart 
Blog (May 6, 2014), http://blog.upstart.com/post/84980267394/sunsetting-income-share-agreements-
on-upstart. 
22.  Id. 
23.  See supra, note 6 
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B. Fantex 
In October 2013, Fantex Inc. announced a trading platform that allows the 
public to acquire shares that track the brand performance of professional 
athletes. Fantex has announced stock offerings relating to NFL athletes Arian 
Foster, a Houston Texans running back; Vernon Davis, a San Francisco 49ers 
tight end; and E.J. Manuel, a Buffalo Bills quarterback.24 In each case, the 
stock is or will be linked to the performance of the athlete’s brand, including 
income earned from NFL contracts, endorsements, and appearance fees. 
Underlying each Fantex stock offering is a contract between Fantex and the 
athlete. Under this contract, the athlete receives a lump-sum amount upfront in 
exchange for a percentage of his future NFL-related income. For example, in a 
$4.2 million IPO, Vernon Davis received $4 million from Fantex upfront in 
exchange for a 10% stake in his future NFL earnings.25 Although Fantex is 
actually offering Fantex, Inc. common stock in a transaction technically distinct 
from the contract between Fantex and the athlete, the popular press has been 
quick to characterize the Fantex deal as an opportunity for shareholders to 
acquire shares in a football player.26 
The Upstart and Fantex transactions and others like them share important 
commonalities that differentiate them from traditional loans: all involve a 
transfer of immediate funding from investors to an individual in return for an 
indeterminate dollar amount of the individual’s future earnings.27 These 
arrangements are likely to proliferate, yet current law lacks an adequate 
theoretical framework for evaluating and regulating them. The absence of such 
a framework is troubling because it may allow the proliferation of more 
aggressive transactions that cross the line between permitted financing of 
human endeavors and excessive control of a person’s human capital. 
Additionally, even transactions that raise no ethical concerns need to be 
analyzed for regulatory purposes. The operation of many legal and regulatory 
systems (including bankruptcy and tax law) depends on careful characterization 
and classification. As with the rise of financial derivatives in the late 1980s, a 
comprehensive examination is required to determine the appropriate legal 
treatment of these new human financing transactions.28 
 
24.  See, e.g., Fantex, Inc. Form S-1 Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933, 
SEC.GOV (Feb. 28, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1573683/ 
000104746914001614/a2218564zs-1.htm. 
25.  Fantex, Inc., Amendment No. 3 to Form S-1, Preliminary Prospectus, Summary, 
SEC.GOV, at 1 (Feb. 28, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1573683/ 
000104746914001605/a2218546zs-1a.htm (Registration Statement relating to E.J. Manuel offering).  
26.  See, e.g., Peter Lattman & Steve Eder, Like that Athlete? Buy a Share, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
18, 2013, at A1 (“[N]ow, thanks to Wall Street, fans can buy a stake in their favorite player.”). 
27.  See supra notes 6 and 11 (referring to the Pave transaction). 
28.  See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen & Paula Schmitz, The Influence of Tax Law on Securities 
Innovation in the United States: 1981-1997, 52 TAX L. REV. 119 (1997); Jeff Strnad, Taxing New 
Financial Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46 STAN. L. REV. 569 (1993). 
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II. 
ANALYZING THE TRANSACTIONS: THE ANALOGY TO EQUITY 
At an instinctual level, and as noted in the popular press, transactions in 
which one sells a percentage of one’s future earnings suggest enslavement, 
servitude, or bondage.29 Although these deals do not and cannot create actual 
property rights in humans, they may nonetheless be problematic because they 
may create indirect ownership interests in human capital via financial contract. 
The question, therefore, is how to determine when a given contractual 
relationship so closely approximates property ownership that it is unethical and 
unconstitutional. In this regard, it is possible that these new human financing 
transactions are contractual interests analogous to equity ownership in a 
business enterprise. 
Businesses generally raise capital by borrowing (i.e., debt financing) or by 
issuing shares or interests in exchange for a capital contribution (i.e., equity 
financing). Debt and equity often look similar because both are types of 
contractual interests issued in exchange for funding. Yet, debt and equity carry 
different connotations and are treated differently in areas such as tax and 
bankruptcy. In the corporate and partnership tax contexts, an equity interest 
suggests ownership of the entity as opposed to a mere creditor relationship. An 
equity owner is generally understood to have an interest in the upside of 
business performance but also greater exposure than debt holders to the 
downside of business failure.30 
Thus, judicial doctrines have developed to determine whether a given 
relationship is debt or equity, regardless of the label bestowed by the parties. In 
the decades-long struggle to ascertain when a party purporting to be a creditor 
in fact is a firm owner, courts have relied on a multi-factor analysis to 
characterize these relationships based on their substance.31 Typical factors 
include: intention of the parties, form of the instrument, whether the interest 
 
29.  See supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text. 
30.  See, e.g., Commissioner v. O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1935) (“The 
shareholder is an adventurer in the corporate business; he takes the risk, and profits from success. The 
creditor, in compensation for not sharing the profits, is to be paid independently of the risk of success, 
and gets a right to dip into the capital when the payment date arrives”); TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United 
States, 459 F.3d 220, 231 (2d Cir. 2006) [hereinafter Castle Harbour] (finding that foreign banks’ 
interest in the partnership “was overwhelmingly in the nature of a secured lender’s interest, which 
would neither be harmed by poor performance of the partnership nor significantly enhanced by 
extraordinary profits” and that “[t]he banks had no meaningful stake in the success or failure of [the 
partnership]” that would indicate “equity participation”); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 112th CONG., 
PRESENT LAW & BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX TREATMENT OF BUS. DEBT 15 (Comm. Print 
2011) (“Courts generally agree that the proper characterization of an instrument requires a facts and 
circumstances analysis, the primary goal of which is to determine whether, in both substance and form, 
an instrument represents risk capital entirely subject to the fortunes of the venture (equity), or an 
unqualified promise to pay a sum certain on a specified date with fixed interest (debt).”). 
31.  See, e.g., Indmar Prods. Co. v. Comm’r, 444 F.3d 771, 777 (6th Cir. 2006); In re 
AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726 (6th Cir. 2001) (using an eleven-factor test drawn from tax law 
to distinguish debt and equity); Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 696 (3d Cir. 1968) 
(citing J. S. Biritz Constr. Co. v. Comm’r, 387 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1967)). 
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rate is fixed, duration of the instrument and existence of a fixed maturity date, 
adequacy of the business’ capitalization, extent of subordination to the claims 
of creditors, and allocation of risk between the parties.32 These factors are 
weighed to determine whether an equity label is warranted. No single factor is 
determinative, and there is no bright-line rule that determines when a contract 
creates equity ownership in a business. Furthermore, even within a given field 
(i.e., bankruptcy or tax), the factors courts consider may vary depending on 
context. This multifactor analysis is useful in evaluating a capital-raising 
contract because many transactions contain elements indicative of both debt 
and equity. Critically, the multi-factor approach enables us to evaluate the 
substance of each individual transaction on a case-by-case basis. 
The new human financing transactions have elements in common with 
business debt and business equity, making it possible to draw upon approaches 
adopted by courts in the debt-equity context to help determine when these new 
transactions cross the line into something problematic, such as human 
ownership. Part III provides a case study, using the Upstart transaction, that 
illustrates how debt-equity analysis might be applied in the human financing 
context. 
III. 
CASE STUDY: APPLYING DEBT-EQUITY ANALYSIS TO THE UPSTART 
TRANSACTION 
What does the application of these factors suggest about the new human 
financing transactions?  A review of key debt-equity factors as applied to the 
Upstart case33 reveals the following: 
Parties’ Intentions/Transaction Label: During 2013, Upstart contended 
that the contract with the Recipients created debt. The 2013 Upstart 
Agreement stated: “You understand and acknowledge that the funding 
amount is a debt owed to us.”34 However, contradictory portions of 
that same 2013 agreement foreshadowed Upstart’s shifting position.35 
Upstart subsequently withdrew that claim in its 2014 version of the 
Agreement, stating in the contract: “This agreement is not a loan.”36 
 
32.   Id. 
33  As noted in Part I.A, the analysis here is based on the Upstart income-share agreements 
offered through May 6, 2014 (and which remain outstanding). 
34.  2013 UPSTART AGREEMENT, supra note 15, at cl. 2.d. 
35.  See, e.g.,2013 UPSTART AGREEMENT, supra note 15, at cl. 2.a.i. The 2013 Agreement 
stated, in part: “[Y]our payment obligations are different from those of a traditional closed-end loan. 
You understand, unless converted, no interest is payable to us, and your monthly annual income 
payments will change each month and year depending on your total income in that month or year.” 
2013 UPSTART AGREEMENT, supra note 15, at cl. 2.d. The instrument could also be converted into 
traditional debt upon default. 2013 UPSTART AGREEMENT, supra note 15, at cls. 2.d, 15, 16. 
36.  2014 UPSTART AGREEMENT, supra note 15, at Introductory Paragraph. Additionally, the 
Upstart website in 2014 reports that the classification of the Upstart agreement is not clear. See How 
are the Securities Treated for U.S. Federal Income Tax Purposes?, UPSTART, 
https://upstart.helpjuice.com/questions/43094-*How-are-the-securities-treated-for-US-federal-income-
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Although not definitive, Upstart’s unwillingness to assert a firm debt 
characterization suggests that the transaction is not traditional debt. 
Interest Rate/Interest Payments: The Upstart Agreement does not 
provide for a fixed interest rate or for payment of interest. Instead, the 
Recipient pays a specified percentage of the Recipient’s total income 
annually (as calculated on Line 22 of IRS Form 1040). The absence of 
interest rates and set interest payments points toward equity 
characterization. 
Priority Relative to Other Claimants/Subordination: Upstart receives 
the specified percentage of the Recipient’s total income per IRS Form 
1040 Line 22. Line 22 total income includes business net income, 
which takes into account business expenses, including allowable 
business interest, reported on IRS Schedule C. Thus, by referring to 
Line 22, the Upstart agreement anticipates that the Recipient will first 
have paid business interest and expenses before “sharing” income with 
Upstart. Such subordination of the Backer’s investment to the payment 
of business expenses may suggest equity characterization. 
Duration: The typical agreement term is five years.37 This time frame 
is compatible with either equity or debt characterization. 
Risk Allocation: An important element in debt-equity analysis is the 
allocation of risk, benefits, and burdens borne by the contracting 
parties. Traditionally, the more closely an investor’s success is 
correlated with the success of the funding recipient, the more likely it 
is that the contract conveys equity ownership.38 Here, the Backers 
benefit only to the degree that the Recipient succeeds financially. The 
Recipient pays a percentage of her income and may be excused from 
payment entirely in years in which her income is too low.39 Thus, there 
is no guaranteed minimum payment or return. The Backer bears the 
risk that the Recipient will be financially unsuccessful. Moreover, if 
the Recipient is financially successful, the Backer can receive 
significant returns on its investment that exceed the rate of return on 
debt.40 In these respects, the Upstart deal terms look more like equity 
than debt. 
Based on this preliminary review of the Upstart transaction under the 
debt-equity framework, it would be difficult to characterize the transaction as 
 
tax-purposes (last visited May 11, 2014) (“The characterization of the funding agreements for U.S. 
federal income tax purposes is unclear.”). 
37.    See supra note 15. 
38.  See, e.g., Castle Harbour, 459 F.3d at 231 (“[T]he Dutch banks’ interest was 
overwhelmingly in the nature of a secured lender’s interest, which would neither be harmed by poor 
performance of the partnership nor significantly enhanced by extraordinary profits. The banks had no 
meaningful stake in the success or failure of Castle Harbour. While their interest was not totally devoid 
of indicia of an equity participation in a partnership, those indicia were either illusory or insignificant 
in the overall context of the banks’ investment.”). 
39.   See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text. 
40.  While there is an absolute ceiling on a Recipient’s total payments to Upstart, this cap 
exceeds the return that would be available on debt. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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debt because the Upstart structure contains several features that suggest equity 
ownership. However, this does not necessarily mean that the Upstart contract 
conveys an equity stake in the Recipients themselves. Debt-equity analysis 
must be more nuanced when applied to investments in people. The question 
with respect to these new human financing transactions is not just whether the 
instrument conveys a general ownership-like claim, but, more specifically, 
whether the contract replicates direct property ownership of humans in a way 
that would trigger ethical, legal, and regulatory concerns. A finding that a given 
transaction is not debt does not necessarily tell us what exactly the investors 
own. We must therefore refine the traditional debt-equity analysis to assess 
whether these transactions create a property ownership interest in humans. 
The presence of four factors in particular would strongly suggest that a 
given human financing contract closely approximates human ownership. First, 
the duration of the contract is important. A contract that calls for payments for 
the remainder of the Recipient’s life has different implications than one limited 
to five years. Second, the percentage of income due is also material. If an 
Upstart contract required payment of 80 percent of the Recipient’s Form 1040 
Line 22 income, the impact would differ from one that called for 7 percent. 
Third, the more control granted to the Backers over the Recipient’s labor, 
investment, family, and lifestyle choices, the more the transaction might look 
like ownership. Finally, the base for sharing income under the agreement is 
relevant.  An agreement that requires sharing income from a specific activity, 
investment, business or job intrudes less on a Recipient’s independence and self 
determination than one that requires sharing a portion of all income generated 
by the individual. 
Therefore, having determined that the Upstart transaction is not debt 
under the traditional business debt-equity test, we must examine these four 
factors to determine whether it constitutes equity in a human or, alternatively, 
some other type of equity-like interest. Although the Upstart Agreement does 
require payment based on Form 1040 Line 22 (i.e., all of the Recipient’s 
income), the other three factors (length, percentage, and operational control) do 
not support a conclusion that the transaction approximates property ownership 
of a human. Thus, we conclude that the Upstart contract likely conveys a type 
of equity-like interest, but not one rising to the level of human ownership that 
ought to be banned. 
The next logical question, which we explore in our future work,41 is “what 
kind of equity-like interest has been conveyed?” That inquiry is not the subject 
of this Essay, which has focused on the threshold question of whether the new 
transactions are permissible and how we might make that assessment. 
However, the answer to the “what kind of equity-like interest?” question will 
be salient for purposes of regulating the transactions. 
 
41.  See Oei & Ring, supra note 8. 
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CONCLUSION 
Debt–equity analysis is a particularly compelling frame through which to 
analyze the new human financing transactions because it illuminates their 
problematic ownership-like characteristics in a nuanced way. The Upstart 
example provides a helpful case study of how debt-equity analysis may be used 
to evaluate these new transactions. Importantly, the multifactor approach used 
in debt-equity analysis—particularly as refined to probe the human ownership 
aspects of these new transactions—does not demand a single universal 
conclusion. Rather, it allows for evaluation of each transaction on a case-by-
case basis. In addition, the use of a factor-based approach can help pinpoint the 
most problematic features of a transaction. Ultimately, debt-equity analysis 
may be useful not just in answering the threshold question of whether the 
contracts should be permissible, but also in making subsequent judgments 
about what regulatory regimes should apply to arrangements otherwise deemed 
permissible. 
Of course, the debt–equity framework has its limitations. Many 
individuals are already overleveraged (i.e., thinly capitalized),42 and many 
traditional debt instruments exhibit equity-like features, such as high and 
variable interest rates. Thus, one might argue that the appearance of additional 
equity-like features in these new arrangements poses no greater risk and raises 
no new moral questions. Tax law’s debt-equity distinction has also been 
criticized on efficiency grounds due to the difficulty, at the margins, of 
establishing a meaningful line between debt and equity.43 Finally, debt-equity 
analysis is not the only frame through which these transactions may be 
analyzed.44 
Such arguments do not undermine the power of the debt-equity 
framework. First, these emerging structures demand careful scrutiny to ensure 
that they are not problematic in unprecedented ways. More broadly, the 
application of the multi-factor approach inherent in debt-equity analysis 
provides an occasion to reflect on the “hidden” ownership-like elements of 
 
42.  See, e.g., David Bornstein, A Way to Pay for College, With Dividends, N.Y. TIMES 
OPINIONATOR ONLINE (June 2, 2011),  http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/02/a-way-to-
pay-for-college-with-dividends/ (questioning whether traditional debt funding of education is more 
like servitude than human capital contracts). 
43.  See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1627–28, 1638–39 (1999) (describing the case law on the debt-equity 
distinction as a “morass” and arguing that the debt-equity line should be drawn based on efficiency 
considerations rather than doctrinal or tax policy concerns). 
44.  That is, an arrangement that does not rise to the level of human ownership but also is not 
traditional debt may be characterized in a number of different ways. For example, the press has 
described the Fantex deal as insurance, in that the athlete diversifies against the risk of injury by 
entering into the contract. See, e.g., Sean Gregory, Be Very Careful Buying Arian Foster Shares, TIME 
(Oct. 18, 2013), http://keepingscore.blogs.time.com/2013/10/18/be-very-careful-buying-arian-foster-
shares/; cf. Rachel Swan, San Francisco Start-Up Drafts 49er Vernon Davis for IPO Roster, SF 
WEEKLY (October 31, 2013), http://blogs.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/2013/10/vernon_davis_fantex.php.  
For a more in-depth discussion, see Oei & Ring, supra note 8. 
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commonplace, existing financing transactions. This approach also allows us to 
critically examine the degree to which society is comfortable with individuals 
effectively surrendering personal autonomy and self-determination due to 
financial obligations and constraints. Second, just because line drawing may 
have efficiency costs does not mean that legislatures, courts and regulators 
should not draw lines. Other policy interests, including the need for effective 
regulation, may override efficiency considerations. Third, the ownership 
dimension of these transactions is so prominent that even if other 
characterizations are possible, the analogy to equity must be taken seriously. 
In sum, despite potential shortcomings, debt-equity analysis remains a 
useful and highly critical lens. It may not be intuitive to think of these new 
transactions as issuances of shares in humans, even if they have equity-like 
characteristics. Yet, an equity designation may best reflect the underlying 
substance of at least some of these transactions. Given the potential for 
proliferation of these human financing structures, the possibility of equity 
characterization—with all of its uncomfortable implications—can no longer be 
ignored. 
